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Located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site, the Test Cell A 
Facility was used in the 1960s for the testing of nuclear rocket 
engines, as part of the Nuclear Rocket Development Program. 
The facility was decontaminated and decommissioned (D&D) 
in 2005 using the Streamlined Approach For Environmental 
Restoration (SAFER) process, under the Federal Facilities 
Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Utilities and process 
piping were verified void of contents, hazardous materials were 
removed, concrete with removable contamination 
decontaminated, large sections mechanically demolished, and 
the remaining five-foot, five-inch thick radiologically-activated 
reinforced concrete shield wall demolished using open-air 
controlled explosive demolition (CED). CED of the shield wall 
was closely monitored and resulted in no radiological exposure 




Since 1998 radiologically-contaminated facilities in the 
Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) program at the 
Nevada Test Site (NTS) have been systematically 
decommissioned using the Streamlined Approach for 
Environmental Restoration (SAFER) process. This paper 
presents the facility history, decontamination and 
decommissioning (D&D) strategy and approach, the details of 
the controlled explosive demolition (CED) of the shield wall at 




The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), predecessor to 
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), began to develop 
nuclear rocket engines in 1955. The AEC and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) organized the 
Space Nuclear Propulsion Office to administer the development 
of an operational nuclear rocket. In 1956 the AEC designated 
127,200 hectares (318,000 acres) in Area 25 (then called 
Area 400) as Project Rover, hoping to advance nuclear reactor 
technology and develop a nuclear-powered rocket for use in 
space travel.  
 
The Test Cell A (TCA) facility (Fig. 1) was one of 4 facilities 
were constructed in the late 1950s and early 1960s utilized for 
the Nuclear Rocket Development Station Program (NRDS). 
Beginning in 1955, NRDS was jointly administered by the 




Figure 1. Location of Test Call A Facility  
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From 1959 to 1966, the Kiwi, Nerva, and Phoebus reactors 
were tested at Test Cell A (Fig. 2). These experimental reactors 
were operated by fission of highly enriched uranium 235 (235U). 
The energy created by the fission of 235U was absorbed by 
pumping liquid hydrogen gas through the reactor where it was 
heated to 2,400º Celsius (4,000º Fahrenheit). The heated 
hydrogen was then exhausted through a nozzle at very high 
velocities to produce thrust. After exiting the nozzle, the 
hydrogen gas was ignited, producing water vapor. The reactors 
were mounted on rail cars and fired upward. Sustained test runs 











Figure 2. Nuclear Rocket Testing (Nerva Reactor) at Test Cell A 
Resulting in Activation of the Shield Wall. 
 
Built in 1958, the TCA facility (Fig. 3) was built in order to 
support Project Rover. Various types of nuclear reactors were 
tested at TCA from 1959 to 1969. Testing resulted in the 
facility being contaminated with fission products, neutron 
activation products, and fuel particles. Most of the 
contamination consisted of isotopes with relatively short 
half-lives that have since decayed away. The remaining 
isotopes of primary concern included cesium (137Cs), strontium 
(90Sr), cobalt (60Co), europium (152Eu, 154Eu, 155Eu), and fuel 
particles consisting of uranium (234U, 235U, 236U, 238U), and 
plutonium (239Pu and 240Pu). The facilities were shut down 
and/or partially deactivated in the mid- to late-1960s and placed 
into long-term mothball status in the early 1970s [2].  
 




TCA was a two-story structure constructed of reinforced 
concrete. The main building, 3113, was approximately 108 m2 
(1,200 ft2) and consisted of an instrument room and mechanical 
room. The second level was approximately 57 m2 (634 ft2) 
which consisted of a penthouse room and a neutronics 
room [2]. Control rods, extending from the reactor, through the 
shield wall into the neutronics room, were used to control the 
power level that the reactor was operated at. Raw data from the 
reactor tests were collected in the penthouse room and 
transmitted via the cabling-access tunnel to be processed. The 
test reactor/rocket motor was controlled from the Reactor 
Control Point (RCP), approximately two miles away.  
 
A 67.3 m2 (748 ft2) building addition was added in the early 
1960s for data acquisition and transmittal to the RCP, test 
director, and staff. Reactor tests were conducted on a 277 m2 
(3,078 ft2) concrete reactor pad, positioned behind the concrete 
reactor shield wall, shielding the remainder of the TCA facility.  
A movable shed sheltered the reactor from weather and satellite 
photography.  
 
The TCA facility was constructed with a maze-like set of  
piping and systems necessary for the storage and transfer of 
cryogenic fluids for running the tests. The reactors were 
assembled and installed on rail-mounted test cars inside the 
assembly bays at the Reactor Maintenance, Assembly, and 
Disassembly (R-MAD) facility and transported via remote 
control on railroad to the test cells where the tests were run.  
 
During the Kiwi-A test in 1962, leaks from high-pressure 
valves at the associated tank farm led to a surge of hydrogen 
gas through the reactor, causing an explosion. Approximately 
7.2 hectares (18 acres) of land surrounding the test stand were 
contaminated with fission products. Ejected materials ranged in 
size from large and identifiable to microscopic pieces, and were 
located visually or by using radiation-survey instruments. 
Contaminated areas were decontaminated by sweeping, 
vacuuming, and mopping at the time. Approximately 780 m 
(2,600 ft) of hard-surface roads were decontaminated with 




Test Cell A was designated as a Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 
115 in the FFACO and was closed using the SAFER process. A 
SAFER closure combines elements of the Data Quality 
Objectives (DQO) process with the observational approach to 
help plan corrective actions. Use of the SAFER process allows 
technical decisions to be made by an experienced 
decision-maker within the conceptual site model established 
prior to conducting closure activities, based on a level of 
process knowledge and operational history. Any uncertainties 
are addressed by documented assumptions verified by sampling 
and analysis, data evaluation, and onsite observations of 
planned activities.  
 
A SAFER plan was prepared, outlining the corrective 
(i.e., remedial) actions and D&D strategy required to close the 
facility. The SAFER plan identified the technical approach and 
the selected end state alternative and was approved by the 
National Nuclear Security Administration, Nevada Site Office 
(NNSA/NSO) and the Nevada Department of Environmental 
Protection (NDEP). Detailed work planning was initially 
performed using the Planning, Optimization, Waste, Estimating 
and Resourcing tool (POWERtool®). This assisted in 
organizing the facility into manageable sections, identifying the 
 3  
 
scope of work and resources for each task, waste estimating, 
and scheduling of each phase of the project, which provided the 
basis for the project documentation. As required, additional 
field investigation activities, including radiological surveys, 
core drilling, sampling, hazardous material identification, and 
other activities were performed to support development of the 
technical documentation.  
 
The TCA facility closure involved a seven-phased strategy: 1) 
Initial facility radiological and hazardous material investigation 
and characterization, 2) site setup and mobilization, 3) removal 
of hazardous materials and equipment, 4) decontamination of 
removable contamination, 5) structure demolition – 
conventional and controlled explosives, 6) final radiological 
release surveys, and 7) waste management [3].  
 
Facility Characterization  
 
Preliminary characterization activities were performed in order 
to plan demolition activities, radiological controls, and waste 
disposal.   Radiological assessment included review of 
historical NTS documents and survey data, field radiological 
surveys, and sampling and analysis.   
 
During characterization of the facility liquids, all systems were 
breached and voided of contents prior to demolition.  This 
helped meet waste disposal criteria and ensure safety of 
workers. During system breaches, contamination, radiation, and 
airborne radioactivity surveys were performed.   
 
Radiological Conditions and Controls 
 
Field surveys included direct frisk of surfaces and materials to 
determine total contamination levels (fixed and removable), 
and swipe surveys to determine removable contamination 
levels.  Little exposed removable contamination was found 
during the initial planning surveys, due to previous extensively 
decontamination; however, the potential for removable 
contamination in certain areas remained, primarily inaccessible 
areas such as in floor drains, underneath cabinets, and in 
surface cracks.  These areas could not be surveyed until they 
were exposed during demolition.   
 
Initial air samples provided a baseline, which was necessary 
because of the uncertainty of background airborne radioactivity 
levels from the resuspension of residual surface contamination 
at TCA. The facility and surrounding land  contrained residual 
contamination from reactor testing and accidents. Over the 
years since testing, most of this contamination was covered by 
windblown soil or driven deeper in the soil by the weather and 
decontamination activities on the concrete pads. By disturbing 
these deposition areas during D&D activities, there was the 
potential to create airborne radioactivity and re-deposit 
radioactive particulates around the facility [6]. This concern 
was addressed in the air sampling program for TCA.   
 
To help assess initial radiological conditions, scaling factors, 
based on historical data for Area 25, were used to determine 
90Sr and uranium and transuranic radioactivity levels based on 
137Cs. Scaling factors were also developed for this project to 
determine bulk concrete activation levels based on surface 
exposure rate measurements, frisker readings, and the Canberra 
In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS®) measurements.  The 
concrete activation levels were needed to determine the mass 
average radioactivity of the concrete in order to calculate 
radioactive waste volumes, determine if the waste met the low-
level landfill radioactivity limits, and provide input into the air 





Actual radiological conditions varied according to the location 
and material.  Fixed beta/gamma contamination levels ranged 
up to 2M dpm/100 cm2 beta/gamma.  Removable beta/gamma 
contamination levels seldom exceeded 1,000 dpm/100 cm2, but 
were as high as 2M dpm/100 cm2 in some locations. A third 
type of contamination, transferable contamination, and was 
defined for the project as contamination on small pieces of 
material that could be transferred easily, such as paint chips.  
This third type of contamination did not meet the definition for 
removable contamination per the NTS/Yucca Mountain Project 
(YMP) Radiological Control Manual [4].  Beta dose rates 
ranged up to 120 mrad/h.  General area dose rates were less 
than 100 µrem/h.  The higher levels of contamination and 
radiation were generally confined to the reactor pad, concrete 
shield wall, and some stainless steel piping; therefore, hot 
particles were monitored during work on the reactor concrete 
pad. 
 
Initial planning conducted prior to starting field investigation 
activities, primarily based on historical documentation, did not 
recognize the source term from the neutron-activated concrete. 
Most of the historical documents accounted for activation in the 
metal rebar than the actual concrete. After field investigation 
activities were initiated, it was quickly determined that 
activated concrete and metal piping were likely the majority of 
the radioactive material onsite; therefore, plans were put 
together to perform ISOCS analysis of the different materials 
located at the site including concrete cores of the reactor shield 
wall and pad.   
 
Several factors were used in assessing the activated concrete.  
Concrete properties were used to estimate activation levels.  
Concrete naturally contains 151Eu and 153Eu in concentrations of 
approximately 0.01 ppm, and about 1 ppm 59Co.  Neutron cross 
sections for the three isotopes are approximately 3000 barns 
(b), 3000 b, and 20 b.  Neutron activation creates 152Eu, 154Eu, 
155Eu, and 60Co.  Other activation products are present, but not 
at levels considered significant for the TCA project.  
 
Two cores were collected, one 2 feet in length and one 5 feet in 
length, both 4 inches in diameter, through the depth of the wall 
at biased locations–the locations of highest radioactivity as 
determined from earlier surveys. Activation attenuated to ‘non-
detect’ after 20 inches in depth.  Cores were drilled from 
opposite the reactor side of the shield wall to minimize worker 
exposure. 
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Figure 4. Shield Wall Characterization 
 
Concrete core samples were taken of the concrete shield wall, 
reactor pad, and roof.  The core samples were taken from the 
full thickness of the concrete at the sample location, five feet in 
the case of the shield wall.  A four inch diameter coring bit was 
used for sampling.  Sample locations were biased in order to 
get the most conservative sample with regards to radioactivity 
levels.  The sample locations were determined from 
radiological surveys of the concrete surfaces.  When possible, 
core sampling equipment was set up on the non-contaminated 
low dose side of the structure in keeping with As Low As 
Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). 
 
The concrete core samples were counted in the laboratory using 
the ISOCS to assess the depth of neutron activation.  This depth 
was found to be 20 inches.  The core samples were also used to 
test the physical properties of the concrete for planning the 
CED.  This included assessing the amount of explosives and the 
geometry for loading the explosives. 
 
.Hazardous Material Removal 
 
Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) waste (asbestos-
containing materials [ACM] and polychlorinated biphenyls 
[PCBs]), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
waste (e.g., lead, cadmium containing foil), and Universal 
wastes (e.g., fluorescent lights and sodium lamps) were 
identified and inventoried in the facility. ACM was removed 
after preliminary radiological surveys and line draining 
activities but prior to all other D&D field activities to provide 
greater health and safety for personnel working inside the 
facility. ACM wrapping found throughout the facility covers 
conduit to protect lines from the intense heat generated from 
the reactor tests. ACM was also found in wall and roof 
penetration mastic, transite wall-board, and piping insulation.   
Heat reflecting foil surrounding electrical conduit was found to 
contain levels of cadmium (Cd) that exceed sanitary landfill 
limits. The Cd-containing silver-colored foil was removed by 
hand due to proximity to ACM and was either included with the 
ACM insulation, generating an ACM impacted hazardous 
waste, a mixed waste if radiologically impacted, or removed 
and packaged separately and disposed of as hazardous waste. 
 
Lead was found in sections of the reactor shield wall to 
minimize neutron penetration.  Lead bricks were backed by 
non-radiologically impacted sand used as a heat shield. Lead 
was also found encapsulated in steel doors throughout the 
exterior of the facility. In addition, lead bricks and wool were 
used as shielding in a number of penetrations in the neutronics 
room. Approximately 30 tons of lead bricks were removed 
from the facility.  All of the lead generated at the TCA facility 
was disposed of as mixed waste at an offsite waste treatment 
and disposal facility in lieu of recycling due to schedule 
constraints and costs.   
 
Paint covering the majority of the facility and reactor pad was 
found to contain PCBs and lead; however, neither was above 
landfill disposal levels according the NDEP lead statute and 
PCB Bulk-Waste rule; therefore, the paint was not removed 
from the concrete surfaces. Accumulations of windblown PCB 
lead-based paint containing high levels of radioactivity were 
removed prior to demolition using HEPA vacuums.  This 
material was removed at this time to avoid spreading 
contamination during demolition activities.  After sampling, it 
was determined that these paint chips met the same waste 
profile as the building debris and could be disposed in the same 
manner, PCB bulk-product low-level waste (LLW). 
 
Thermostats and instrumentation were present throughout the 
facility; however, investigation found these materials did not 
contain mercury and were left inplace and disposed of with the 
building debris. All large circuit boards removed from the 
facility were disposed of as hazardous waste due to leachable 
levels of lead.  Universal wastes (fluorescent lights and sodium 
lamps) were removed from the facility and sent to an offsite 




Prior to mechanical demolition and CED, removable 
radioactive surface contamination was decontaminated to the 
extent possible, and contaminated materials were removed from 
the facility when possible, using various techniques including 
wiping, debris/material removal, pressure washing, and 
vacuuming.   
 
Radiologically-impacted mastic sealant located in the cracks 
and seams on the roof was removed during ACM remediation 
activities.  HEPA vacuum cleaners were used in normal 
industry fashion to decontaminate surfaces and support other 
activities.  Impacted soil and other debris were removed from 
railroad trenches and troughs built into the concrete reactor pad; 
troughs were grouted to avoid re-contamination during 
demolition activities. Masslin sheets were used to 




Radiological controls were factored in during D&D planning 
activities, including evaluating various decontamination and 
demolition methods for accomplishing tasks.  The best methods 
were selected based on several factors, including resources, 
schedule, industrial, and radiological safety.  The most 
conservative approach was used for determining radiological 
controls; assuming the worse expected case and protecting to 
this level, as circumstances deemed necessary.  This method is 
in contrast to the graded approach were minimal radiological 
controls are initially implemented then upgraded when 
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radiological conditions are found exceeding initial assumptions.  
This method ensured maximum safety of the workers, the most 
important consideration of the job, while supporting an efficient 
demolition process. Each activity was assessed to determine 
radiological controls. Radiological work permits (RWP) were 
prepared to cover conditions specific for each specific activity.   
 
If unexpected levels of radiation/contamination were detected, 
work would be halted and the radiological controls adjusted.  
Once the proper controls were in put in place and the identified 
task was determined radiologically safe, work would resume.  
An example of this occurred when high levels of radiation were 
encountered in soil at the bottom of railroad trenches on the 
reactor pad.  The trenches had soil and wood bottoms which 
absorbed contaminants that were washed from the pad after 
testing and later covered with non-impacted soil.  
 
Radiological survey plans provided specific direction beyond 
what was provided in health physics procedures to provide 
detailed guidance for the project RCTs. Plans included air 
survey plans, which accounted for wind direction; breathing 
zone air sampling; requirements for trending the data; and 
methods for assessing the results while properly accounting for 
radon daughters.  Additional survey plans were written for 
performing the initial characterization survey, surveying 
demolition debris and previously inaccessible areas, performing 
radiological monitoring during the CED blast, performing the 
post-blast survey, and performed the final survey. 
 
Other radiological controls included using engineering and 
administrative controls to minimize personnel exposure, 
including Radiological Protection (RP) and Environmental 
Restoration (ER) management oversight, daily pre-job 
briefings, and dust control, Routine and job-specific 
radiological surveys, evaluation of data, and trend identification 
provided the first line of defense in identifying trends and 
anomalies in radiological levels. The largest trend of increased 
radioactivity was identified by air sampling during concrete 
demolition and debris loading activities. Baseline bioassay 
samples were taken for personnel working in areas containing 
high levels of uranium and transuranic contamination; however, 
no uptakes occurred and therefore no additional samples were 
required. Radiological controls were sufficient to prevent 




Upon completion of decontamination, the remaining structures 
were ready for demolition. Both conventional and non-
conventional demolition techniques were used. Buildings 3113, 
3113A, 3113B, the exhaust stack, and moveable shed were 
removed using hydraulic hammers and shears, as the thickness 
of the concrete ranged from 1 to 3 feet thick (Fig. 5). Dust 
suppression was used throughout conventional demolition 






















Figure 5. Mechanical Demolition  
 
A 100,000 gallon liquid hydrogen cryogenic tank (i.e. dewar) 
was removed as part of the TCA D&D activities. The dewar 
was composed of an outer steel shell surrounding an inner 
stainless steel chamber that held the liquid hydrogen.  Between 
the two shells, a 3 foot void space filled with perlite insulation 
material. Initially holes were made on the sides of the dewar to 
vacuum the perlite out.  The perlite, with consistency of talcum 
powder, proved very difficult to vacuum from small holes since 
moisture had penetrated the outer dewar over time solidifying 
the perlite it contacted. This problem was mitigated by 
removing the outer dewar shell from the top-down, vacuuming 
perlite as it was exposed. Any areas that had clumped were 
easily broken apart when exposed. 
 
The vacuum system removed the Perlite from the dewar and 
discarded it into specially-designed plastic bags located inside  
roll-off containers. The stainless steel inner dewar was size 
reduced using burn rods since the hydraulic shears had 
difficulty cutting and size reducing the material.   
 
Controlled Explosive Demolition Calculations 
 
A formal ALARA review by the NTS ALARA Committee was 
performed on the controlled explosive demolition portion of the 
work.  Several suggestions put forth from the ALARA 
Committee were implemented into the explosive demolition 
activity.    
 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) CAP-88PC 
model was used in the final calculations of the atmospheric 
dispersion modeling to determine the bounding airborne 
radioactivity concentrations that would be produced from the 
CED blast. The calculation, based on the ISOCS results from 
cores of the reactor shield wall, assumed 3 cubic feet of 
concrete dust was uniformly distributed in an arbitrarily 
selected volume of air–this value was provided by Controlled 
Demolition, Inc. (CDI), who would perform the CED blast.   
 
The activity of this dust was assumed to be equal to the highest 
measured concrete activity determined from the core samples. 
It was also assumed that all radioactivity settled onto the 
ground at the bottom of this volume. This provided insight into 
the maximum expected airborne radioactivity levels and ground 
contamination levels down wind of the blast. Calculations 
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produced a maximum downwind dose of 0.0058 mrem at 40 
meters from the wall. 
 
CED Site Preparation 
 
Prior to the CED of the reactor shield wall, the debris generated 
from mechanical demolition was staged on pads  prepared from 
non-impacted barrow pit soil, away from the shield wall. The 
pads provided a base that would allow the waste to easily be 
picked up and loaded into trucks without cross contaminating 
the underlying native soil.   
 
A method for assessing the spread of contamination from the 
CED plume was developed and tested.  One foot square sticky 
pads were placed in the approved down wind direction from the 
shield wall.  Sticky pad placement was preplanned.  The sticky 
pads were placed from 40 m to approximately 300 m radially 
out from the shield wall, approximately 50 m apart.  Each of 
these rows were in directions 30 degrees apart from each other.  
Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) coordinates were taken at 
each sticky pad location.  A set of control sticky pads were 
placed several day prior to the blast as controls.  A new set of 
sticky pads were placed just prior to the blast and collected 
immediately after the blast. 
 
The release of radioactivity from the CED was minimized by 
CDI wrapping a geotextile fabric cover around the shield wall, 
held inplace by a chain link fence, which also helped to curb 
the velocity of debris ejected.  The intention of the cover was to 
contain large flying debris and minimize fragment dispersion.  
Dust-sized particles became airborne and were carried by the 
wind as expected; however, it was minimized to the extent 
possible.  The covers provide some explanation of lower than 
expected downwind air sample results from those expected by 




The CED of the shield wall was the most challenging phase of 
the project and was the last remaining structure to be 
demolished. CED had not been performed on the NTS since the 
1970s. No explosive demolition of radioactive structures, prior 
to TCA, had ever been performed at the NTS. The CED 
consisted of radiological characterization, airborne dispersion 
modeling, planning of controlled explosive demolition, and 
monitoring of dust plume generated from the CED. 
 
World-renowned experts, CDI, were subcontracted to perform 
the CED of the shield wall, based on their experience with 
similar thickness and size of concrete at the H-Reactor 
demolition project at the Hanford Site in Washington. 
Approximately 125 kilograms (275 pounds) of explosives were 
loaded into holes drilled into the shield wall approximately 2½ 
feet apart and a minimum of 3 feet in depth.  After conducting a 
test blast to ensure the correct amount of explosives would be 







Figure 6. CED  of Shield Wall 
 
During the CED blast, extra precautions were taken to 
minimize personnel and equipment exposure.  Authorization to 
proceed with the CED activity was only granted by RP after the 
wind was orientated in the proper direction to carry the dust 
plume away from the site support facilities, heavy equipment, 
and other demolition support materials, which were staged 
upwind away from roads and parking areas. 
 
Radiological survey data from the CED activity were within the 
bounds of predicted values.  The airborne radioactivity levels 
were bounded by the plume modeling results, and 
contamination levels on the ground at the predetermined 
contamination survey locations (sticky pad locations) were less 
than detectable.   
 
Building Debris Disposal 
 
The primary form of contamination at the TCA facility was in 
the form of activation products caused by operation of nuclear 
reactors.  It was determined after the first stages of traditional 
demolition activities that demolition of activated concrete was 
leading to elevated levels of transferable contamination on 
equipment and building debris.  Since the construction debris 
landfill at the NTS cannot take any debris containing removable 
contamination exceeding levels of Table 4-2 of the NTS/YMP 
RCM. Based on this determination, all the building debris that 
exceeded this limit for transferable contamination was 
containerized disposed at the NTS Area 5 LLW landfill.   
 
After explosive demolition all waste that was determined to 
exceed the sanitary landfill radioactivity limits was stockpiled 
on the soil pads for shipment. The project teamed with a 
specialty bag producing company to meet the shipping and 
disposal requirements of the LLW landfill. ER and a liner/bag 
manufacturing company devised a new system to produce a 
lifting frame that could be used to lift empty puncture resistant 
geotextile liners into end dumps in an open position.   
 
Using the lifting frame and a crane to load the open bags into 
the truck beds this eliminated the need to place employees 
inside the end dumps, exposing them to dangerous situations 
and reducing the unfolding and setting time. Once loaded and 
closed, the bags presented a closed system, thus reducing the 
amount of radiological surveys required for release from the 
site and the landfill after dumping.  Approximately 140 bags 
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were shipped to the LLW landfill with an average content of 13 
cubic yards of debris. 
 
Final End State 
 
Any remaining contamination above the established radioactive 
limits was removed from the reactor pad by aggressive 
scabbling. After demolition activities, a decontamination 
station was set up for decontaminating heavy equipment which 
consisted of a plastic lined basin where equipment could be 
moved to and washed down with a pressure washer. Resulting 
radiologically impacted decontamination material from all of 
these activities would be managed and disposed of as LLW. 
 
When the demolition debris had been removed, and the 
concrete reactor pad surface had been decontaminated, final 
release surveys of the building foundations commenced. 
 
Criteria existed for soil contamination, removable surface 
contamination, total contamination (primarily fixed), and dose 
rates.  An understanding of the distribution of radioactivity on 
or in the medium was also factored in when performing release 
surveys.  The SAFER Plan, which documented the closure 
strategies and final posting requirements of the TCA site, stated 
that after demolition the entire facility footprint area would be 
downgraded to a Controlled Area and the posting the building 
foundation drains as internal contamination.  This reduction 
was reached on the main building foundation, which was 
shielded from neutron penetration by the reactor shield wall, 
but not on the reactor pad foundation.   
 
Because of the elevated levels of fixed contamination from 
concrete activation of the reactor pad, not identified at the time 
of the SAFER Plan approval, portions of this reactor pad area 
were posted as a Radiological Materials Area (RMA) and some 
as an Underground RMA due to underground waste lines and 
underlying activated concrete and soil.  The SAFER Plan 
process allows for site characterization as work proceeds; 
therefore, these postings were agreed upon with NNSA and 












The Test Cell A D&D Project, proved the effectiveness of CED 
of radiologically-activated reinforced concrete, while 
maintaining contamination control and personnel safety. In 
addition, lessons learned applicable to other D&D and ER 
projects across the DOE complex and in the D&D 
community/industry were documented for future use for the 
upcoming CAU 116: Test Cell C (TCC) Facility D&D Project.  
 
Faced with many challenges primarily associated with 
performing D&D remediation activities and first time 
evolutions under the SAFER Process where characterization is 
performed concurrently with D&D activities. The D&D project 
team met the challenges, coordinated with onsite and offsite 
organizations, engaged the regulators and stakeholders to meet 
all fee milestones, addressed issues immediately, and captured 
numerous lessons learned to apply to current and future D&D 
projects. Lessons learned include the following: 
 
• Preliminary investigation activities, such as facility 
radiological surveys, early removal of hazardous 
materials, first-hand facility knowledge, extensive 
characterization sampling, and waste stream 
determination resulted in a more solid technical 
approach and safer working environment. 
 
• Size-reducing work areas improved engineering and 
administrative controls during lead removal activities, 
leading to smaller areas being impacted with lead-dust 
and radionuclides.   
 
• Implementing a demolition debris survey plan that 
contained specific direction on radiological survey 
requirements to provide consistent debris 
characterization and expedite debris loading and truck 
exit surveys.  
 
• Inclusion of specific waste removal, sizing, handling, 
containerizing, and packaging requirements in the 
work package and waste management plans can 
reduce double and triple handling of highly 
contaminated soils and debris, reducing potential for 
employee exposure.   
 
• Team reviews served as an excellent mechanism to 
integrate efficiency, safety, and sequence into the 
work packages. Incorporating the entire project team’s 
input, lead to fewer revisions of work control 
documentation during the project, streamlined the 
approval process, integrated safety into planning, and 
ensured the proper equipment was onsite. 
 
• Development of CED protocols and checklist prior to 
detonation to ensure the safety of personnel and 
equipment, and effective size-reduction of the shield 
wall. 
 





D&D of the TCA Facility, with the CED of the shield wall, 
paved the road for the next NTS D&D project, Test Cell C, the 
next generation nuclear rocket test facility. With proven 
methods, baseline data, established protocols, and experienced 
personnel, the experience and lessons learned can be captured 
and applied to the Test Cell C project, a larger facility, with the 
same set of challenges.  
 
The program, as a whole, now benefits from a more 
experienced technical and management team and more 
involved supporting organizations (e.g., Environment, Safety, 
and Health; Radiological Control; Construction, Waste 
Management), as well as a defined strategy and approach for 





This paper would not be possible were it not for individual and 
collective contributions from project team members of National 
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